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Effects of Property Acquisition and Disposal on Property Stock Value 
Abstract 
 
The study utilizes the event study methodology to evaluate the effect(s) of acquisition and/or 
disposal announcement(s) on the value of property stocks of 22 companies listed on the Singapore 
Exchange (SGX). The study focuses on the period from 1994 to 1999. It was found that the impact 
of both acquisition and disposal announcements on shareholder wealth during the period, albeit 
positive, is not significant at the 0.05 level. However, a company’s announcement of intent to 
dispose of its asset(s) had a significantly positive cumulative excess return during the period. This 
implies that, apart from announcement of intent to dispose of asset(s), investors generally cannot 
significantly profit from a prior knowledge of acquisition and/or disposal announcements. 
Furthermore, it was found that “size effect” is of no significance to Singapore property stock 
market. 
Key Words:  Property, Acquisition, Disposal, Announcement, and Abnormal Profit. 
 
Introduction 
Event study has become an important part of finance since the seminal study of stock splits by 
Fama et al. (1969). However, research in event study has principally focused on major 
international stock markets. Smaller stock markets of emerging and newly developed economies 
have received little attention. The paper, by specifically focusing on the acquisition/disposal of 
property asset/business in Singapore, adds a newly developed market perspective to the extant 
literature that is centred on the major international markets. 
 
The paper provides an event analysis of property companies that are listed on the stock exchange 
of Singapore (SGX). Two specific events are examined: announcement of “intent to acquire and/or 
dispose”, and announcement of “completed acquisitions and/or disposals” of property asset and/or 
business. The literature on earnings announcements suggests that equity size, measured by the 
market capitalization, plays a significant role in detecting the existence of an event. Therefore, the 
paper also considers the impact of company size, vis-à-vis each of the events that are being 
assessed, on the performance of securitized real estate in Singapore. The analytical study further 
offers a test of the market efficiency hypothesis for Singapore property stock market. The paper 
therefore begins with a review of the relevant literature, and research strategy/design. This is 
followed by the methodology and a brief discussion of the appropriate statistical methods of 
testing for abnormal returns. The empirical results are thereafter presented, analysed, interpreted 
and discussed to draw conclusions for Singapore property stock market. 
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Literature Review 
Although the acquisition and/or disposal of corporate property assets affect(s) shareholders’ 
wealth, the nature and extent of such effect(s) have been a polemical issue among researchers. 
Hite and Owers(1983), Schipper and Smith (1983), Hite et al. (1984) and Owers and Rogers 
(1986) find that positive abnormal returns result from acquisitions and divestiture of real estate 
assets.  This is attributed to the supposedly uniqueness of real estate and the attendant tax benefits.  
Allen and Sirmans (1987) have examined the wealth effects of REIT merger on the acquiring 
trust’s shareholders to find a significant positive two-day abnormal return of 5.78%. Allen and 
Sirmans (1987) further demonstrate that the value gains from the merger exercise are mainly 
attributable to improved management efficiency rather than offsetting tax losses. McIntosh et al. 
replicate the earlier findings of significant wealth effects accruing to the target REITs on the 
announcement of the merger proposal. However, there were insignificant abnormal returns for the 
target REITs in the pre-merger announcement period. Glascock et al. (1989) show that buyers 
(firms engaged in acquisition) do not experience abnormal returns and that only sellers (firms 
engaged in disposals) enjoy weak positive returns (see also Wong et al., 1993; McIntosh et al., 
1995;).  The difference in the results of Glascock et al. (1989) and that of Allen and Sirmans 
(1987), Hite et al. (1984) is most likely attributable to different sample composition.  The former 
group of researchers basically focused on non-property companies buying and selling property 
assets, while the latter group focused on property firms.   
 
In addition, Glascock et al. (1991) find that market structure is important in determining the 
apportionment of gains to buyers and sellers. Furthermore the gain is found to be higher for both 
buyers in single-purchase groups, and sellers, when the transaction involves a property, such as 
land and buildings, than when it involves a division or subsidiary of a business because of the tax 
gain attributable to property assets.  Owners of property assets can enjoy a net gain in depreciation 
benefits over cost of asset management.  Furthermore, the company may find it advantageous to 
keep the fully depreciated property asset as long as the operating advantages offset the tax 
benefits.  It must be noted, however, that companies in Singapore normally cannot depreciate their 
properties against profits.  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the value of property assets belonging to non-property 
firms may be realized by engaging in strategies such as acquisitions and disposals [Owers and 
Rogers (1986)] and sales-leasebacks [Rutherford (1990)].  However, Owers and Rogers (1986) 
state, inter alia, that their findings on sell-off transactions cannot be interpreted as supporting the 
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notion that property assets are undervalued to a greater extent than other types of assets.  They 
contrasted their findings with the conclusions of studies based on the examination of property 
asset realignment by spin-off to discover that the two types of restructuring have different tax 
implications.  It was also found that the smaller stock price changes in the case of sell-offs might 
result from differences in tax effects, information disclosure or relative sizes of transactions. 
 
Liow (1997) concludes that corporate real estate disposals and sale-leasebacks are value-
enhancing activities. One reason for this is that, the stock market sometimes fails to recognize the 
value of retail firm’s real estate holdings when the holdings are held as part of a conglomerate and 
carried at low balance sheet values.  Furthermore, Liow (1997) finds that disposal decisions are 
more profitable than acquisition decisions in the market’s evaluation.   
 
Another aspect of the event study literature is the impact of the size of the firm on stock price (i.e. 
size effect). Banz (1981), Keim (1983), Roll (1983), and Blume and Stambaugh (1983) conclude 
that prices of small capitalization stocks increase significantly relative to large capitalization 
stocks. This has been replicated by Bernard and Thomas (1990) who find that a “small firm” effect 
exists for the earnings announcement events while Ball and Kothari (1991) find that positive 
abnormal returns decrease as firm size increases. It is therefore hypothesized that the 
announcement of property acquisitions and disposals has a significant impact on share returns.  
Furthermore, the return behaviour around an announcement date is a function of the asset as 
well as the completion of, or the intent to complete an event, and the size of the firm.  
 
To test the hypotheses, buyers and sellers are grouped according to the type of event (i.e. 
completion or intent to complete) and the type of property asset (i.e. property or 
division/subsidiary).  A normal return for the sample companies’ shares based on the general 
market conditions will be identified.  By comparing actual returns around an event announcement 
to the normal or expected returns, the impact of announcement effect can be operationalised by 
measuring the excess or unexpected returns that cannot be explained by the general market 
influences.  The significance of the announcement effect will be examined through statistical 
testing of the above hypotheses. 
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Research Strategy 
 
The event parameter model [see Equation (1)] will be adopted for this research.  For each 
observation in the forecast interval, there is one dummy variable that has a value of one on that 
observation only and is zero elsewhere.  Thus, in the forecast interval of N observations, N dummy 
variables are required:  
                
 
T + N  
  Rj = j + j R mt +  τjn Dnt + ℯjt   ,  
    =    n T + 1 
     
t  =  1, …. T  ,  T  +  1, ….  T  + N    (1)           
 
where Rjt        =  return on security j on day t; 
j         =   OLS estimate of the intercept; 
j          = OLS estimate of the slope or measure of systematic risk;  
 R mt    = return on the market on day t;  
τjn         = estimated coefficient on dummy variable Dnt, this is equivalent to PEjt; 
Dnt   = a dummy variable that is equal to one on observation n and is zero   
elsewhere; 
ℯjt      = residual for security j on day t. (Note that with the dummy variable   
technique, the residual will be zero for observation T+1 through T+N); 
T      = observations in estimation window; 
  N     = observations in event window. 
 
Since the N observations in the forecast interval are “dummied out”, these observations will not 
affect the estimated slope or intercept which is a function of the T observations.   
 
On the actual day of announcement, t = 0.  The event window includes 14 days each before and 
after (i.e. t = -14 to t = +14) the announcement or event date.  A 100-day pre-event estimation 
window (i.e. t = -114 to t = -15, inclusive) is selected for the study.  Most of the precedent event 
studies that utilise daily returns do not elucidate on how the length of the estimation and event 
window is determined [see Asquith et al. (1983), Rutherford (1990), Owers and Rogers(1986), 
Glascock et al.(1991), Glascock et al. (1987), Zaima and Hearth (1985)]. However, appropriate 
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disclaimers are stated to assure the reader that the window is wide enough to avoid contaminating 
the regression.  
 
Berry et al. (1990) calculated residuals on the first 90 observations of the 100 observations for the 
estimation period.    Abnormal performance was injected into day 91 and residuals were calculated 
for days 91 through 100 to conform to the Brown and Warner (1985). Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) 
selected a 220-day estimation period ending 31 days before the event date (i.e. day t = -250 
through day t = -31) mainly because it accords with the period used in Brown and Warner (1985).  
Liow (1997) chose a five-week interval around the announcement week but he states that the 
choice of the length of the event window was essentially arbitrary. Thompson (1988) used six 
event days per firm as this is claimed to be an efficient method of expanding the sample size [see 
Dyckman et al., (1984)].  Thus, a total of 6 x 465 (firms), i.e. 2,790 individual firm t-tests were 
conducted and this is claimed to be sufficient to distinguish any important differences in Type I 
errors and power.  Thus, the estimation and event periods of 100 and 29 days respectively that are 
used for this study are wide enough to avoid contaminating the regression.  
 
Since this research is employing firm-specific events, the following procedures will be adopted, 
whilst assuming cross-sectional independence (Karafiath and Spencer, 1991): 
1. Estimate Equation (1) via OLS for each firm j. 
2. For each firm j, program the statistical package to calculate a t-test for the specified 
daily or cumulative prediction error.  It must be noted that with sufficient degrees of 
freedom (not a problem with daily return data) the t-distribution is asymptotically 
standard normal. 
3. Denote this firm-specific event test statistic as Z = (1/ J)  Zj.  This test will be 
asymptotically normal.  
 
Research Design 
The parameters (j and j) of the event parameter model are estimated during the estimation 
window, i.e. (-114, -15).  Prediction errors or abnormal returns are calculated for each trading day 
in the event window i.e. (-14, +14) [equivalent to τjn or estimated coefficient of dummy variable 
Dnt  in Equation (1)]. 
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The individual prediction errors or residuals for a sample of J securities (PEjt) are averaged to 
produce a series of mean prediction errors for each day t (MPEt) in the event period.  
Mathematically, this is expressed as:   
  
j = J
 
                                    MPEt   = 1/ J X            PEjt                                                       (2) 
                             
j = 1 
 
 
The cumulative prediction error from day T1j to day T2j for a sample of J securities  (CPEj) is 
defined as: 
 
 
         T =T2j 
CPEj  =         MPEt                                                         (3) 
           T = T1j 
 
The accumulation is performed over various intervals.  The selection of periods over which to 
accumulate the prediction errors (or abnormal returns) is left to the researcher. However it is 
desirable to provide information on when abnormal returns begin, and end, a nonrandom pattern 
[Peterson (1989:48)].  In other words, the interval from day T1j to day T2j is to be defined by the 
researcher.  For the purpose of this study, CPEj is calculated for four intervals (see Exhibits 5 and 
7). For a sample of J securities, the mean cumulative prediction error (MCPE) is defined as: 
 
 
   j = J
 
                 MCPE = 1/ J X              CPEj                                                          (4) 
                     
j = 1 
 
The expected value of CPEj is zero in the absence of an abnormal performance. Following recent 
event studies, prediction errors (PEjt) are standardised before they are aggregated, and the 
standardised aggregates form the basis of the test statistics.  Assuming cross-sectional 
independence, standardised prediction errors are calculated as follows [see Brown and Warner 
(1985:28)]: 
 
   SPEjt =  PEjt / σ (PEj),                                                (5) 
 
where   SPEjt   =  standardised prediction errors for security j on day t; 
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PEjt     =   prediction errors or abnormal returns on security j on day t; 
σ PEj  =  estimated standard deviation for prediction error of security j (see 
Equation 6 and 7) ;  
                             
          t = -15                                                                
-½
 
                            σ (PEj)    =             ( PE jt – PE*j)2 / k                               (6) 
                                                                  t = -114   
 
                  
 
   t = -15 
 and  PE*j = 1/ k X            PEjt                                                  (7) 
                             t = -114   
 
 
where PE*j  =  mean prediction error on security j during the 100-day  pre-event estimation 
window  (-114, -15) inclusive; 
    k    = length of estimation window, in this study,  k = 100; 
 
The calculation for σ (PEjt) in this paper assumes that any variation in the market during the event 
period is the same as it was during the estimation period.  To adjust for any market variation in the 
event period and the number of observations during the estimation period, the standard error 
proposed by Patell (1976) has to be used.  Each SPEjt is assumed to be distributed unit normal in 
the absence of abnormal performance.  Under this assumption, Z (CPE) is also unit normal. 
 
To test the null hypothesis of zero prediction error (or abnormal return) on any event day t, the 
following test statistics is calculated: 
 
                                               j = J 
  Z (PE) t    =          SPEjt    (n) -½                                          (8) 
                                  j = 1 
 
where SPEjt   = standardised prediction error for security j on day t;  
   J       =  the number of sample securities at day t.   
 
The mean standardised cumulative prediction error (MSCPEj) over the interval from day T1j to day 
T2j  for  J firms is:  
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                          t = T2j 
         MSCPEj =            SPEjt    (m) -½                                    (9) 
                                                                                                              t = T1j 
 
 
where  MSCPEj  =  mean standardised cumulative prediction error for J securities for  the  
cumulative interval starting from day T1j to day T2j;  
                  m      = adjustment factor which adjusts for the number of days for the  
                   cumulative interval starting from day T1j to day T2j. 
 
To test the null hypothesis of zero prediction error accumulated over specified interval relative to 
the event, the test statistic for J securities is the sum of the MSCPEj divided by the square root of J 
(assuming serial independence) is:  
 
               j = J 
Z(CPE)    =           MSCPEj    (J) -½                                   (10) 
                                   j = 1 
 
where MSCPEj  = mean standardised cumulative prediction error for the sample of j 
securities for  the  cumulative interval starting from day T1j to day T2j; 
        J        = number of securities in the sample for the particular interval. 
 
The parametric test is used for this study because Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Berry et al 
(1990) demonstrate that a nonparametric sign test assuming an excess return median of zero is 
mis-specified. This appears to be controverted by Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Barber and 
Lyon (1996) who have found that nonparametric test statistics are more powerful than parametric 
t-statistics. It must be noted, however, that Corrado and Zivney (1992) use a sample excess return 
median (instead of assuming a median of zero) while the study of Barber and Lyons (1996) relates 
to accounting-based measures of operating performance. 
 
Methodology 
 
The sample for this study consists of 22 public-listed companies (Exhibit 1) while the study covers 
the period from 1994 to 1999.  Out of the 26 companies that were listed as property stocks during 
the period, only 22 of them made public announcements on property acquisitions and disposals.  
There were about 163 acquisitions and 40 disposals (see Exhibits 1 and 2) during the study period.  
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Exhibits 1 and 2 here 
The companies have been classified as “small” (S) or “big” (B) according to their market 
capitalization as at 5 April of each year. Companies with market capitalization of less than S$800 
million are categorized as “small” while those with a market capitalization of at least S$800 
million are classified as “big” (see Cotter, 1997). 
 
In view of Glascock et al. (1991) classification of property assets into two categories – Real 
Property, and Real Estate divisions and subsidiaries – the acquisition and disposal completions 
have been accordingly segregated and presented in Exhibit 3. The figures in Exhibit 3 suggest that 
property companies deal in property assets (111 completions) more than property divisions and/or 
subsidiaries (55 completions) 
Exhibit 3 here 
Since the study is based on daily returns, it is imperative that the first public disclosure of the 
transaction is “accurately” identified (Owers and Rogers, 1986:31) Therefore the announcement 
data for the study were extracted from the Straits Times (ST), Business Times (BT), and Dow 
Jones Interactive (DJI) on the following bases: 
 
(i) When the Straits Times and Business Times report different event dates, the earlier 
date was selected [Owers and Rogers (1986:31)].   
 
(ii) If firm j had more than one announcement of a different nature (i.e. an acquisition and 
disposal, or a property and a business-related event) on the same day, both events were 
excluded since it was difficult to distinguish how much each event had contributed to 
the abnormal returns.   
 
(iii) When a firm experienced multiple-day events, only the first announcement was 
included in the sample to reduce event clustering.  For example, when DBS took a 
stake in Sea View hotel and subsequently increased its stake in the hotel, the news was 
reported on several days consecutively, but only the first date of public announcement 
was included in the sample. This helps to reduce correlation between residuals of the 
announcements on consecutive days and hence, reduce bias results. 
 
(iv) An event that involved more than one firm in the sample was removed from the 
sample, as it was no longer firm specific. 
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Furthermore, daily returns were extracted from DATASTREAM and adjusted for any 
capitalization change.  The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), now called the Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) ALL-Singapore Index was used as a proxy for market return (Rmt).  The daily 
return used in this study is calculated on the same basis as Henderson (1989:287): 
 
   Rjt = ln (1 + Return)                                                    (11) 
where Rjt = continuously compounded return on security j on day t.  
 
The normality of the return distribution can be improved by using log-transformed returns.  In 
addition, the transformation eliminates negative values and makes it easier to convert daily returns 
to weekly or monthly returns by taking a compound product. Returns will include only price 
changes and hence: 
Return = (Pt – Pt-1 )/ Pt-1                                                (12) 
or   Rjt = ln {1 +(Pt – Pt-1 )/ Pt-1}                                       (13) 
where Pt and Pt-1 are the closing prices of the index at day t and t-1 respectively. 
The Durbin-Watson statistics (to be obtained from authors if required) indicate the existence of 
autocorrelation of residuals for some of the models.  However, Reinganum (1982), Theobald 
(1983), Brown and Warner (1985) , and Dyckman et al (1984) have shown that the complicated 
procedures advocated by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) to resolve the 
autocorrelation problem do not produce betas, which are significantly better than betas from OLS 
estimates. Brown and Warner (1985) further states that these complicated procedures do not 
improve the power of event studies. Henderson (1989) has accordingly concluded that corrections 
for the autocorrelation of residuals appear unwarranted. In view of this, autoreg models are not run 
for this study. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
The first null hypothesis is that the value of prediction error (abnormal return) on any event day t 
= 0 is zero (i.e. MPEt equals zero). 
     H0: µ  = 0 
     H1: µ ≠ 0 
 
The second hypothesis is that the value of prediction error for a specified accumulated interval is 
zero (i.e. CPEj equals zero). 
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     H0: µ  = 0 
     H1: µ ≠ 0 
At the 5% significance level, the critical value of Z (0.95) = < - 1.96 or >+ 1.96.  Thus the 
acceptance region at the 5% level is –1.96 < Z < +1.96.  This implies that the null hypothesis is 
rejected when the test statistic is < - 1.96 or >+ 1.96. The impact of firm size is tested by 
abnormal returns for “small” and “big” companies. 
 
Test for Announcement Effect – Completed Acquisitions and Disposals 
The mean prediction errors (MPEt) and cumulative prediction errors (CPEj) in Exhibits 4 and 5 are 
each derived from Equations (2) and (3) while the test statistics are derived from Equations (8) and 
(10) respectively. 
Exhibits 4 & 5 here 
It is evident from the cumulative prediction errors (CPEj) for the interval (-1, 0) that both 
acquisition and disposal activities were profitable.  Real estate firms, which announced the 
completion of their acquisition and disposal activities, enjoyed a positive 0.56% and 0.27% 
cumulative excess return respectively (see Exhibit 5).  On the event date itself (t = 0), shareholders 
in sub-sample COMP_ACQ and COMP_DISP enjoyed positive excess return of 0.27% and 0.47% 
respectively (see Exhibit 4).  These results are similar to the findings of Allen and Sirmans (1987) 
and Hite et al. (1984).  Although both returns are not statistically significant, the evidence of 
abnormal returns shows that the stock market does react to acquisition and disposal 
announcements.   
 
Immediately after the announcements of completed property acquisitions and disposals [i.e. 
interval (+1, +14)], buying and selling firms suffered from declining market values (-1.44% and -
0.99% respectively – Exhibit 4) despite positive returns of +0.27% and +0.47% respectively on the 
event day itself (Exhibit 5). For example, on day t = +1, all the firms in sub-sample COMP_ACQ 
experienced an average negative abnormal return of 0.41%. This trend of negative abnormal return 
continued to day t = +10.  This implies that the stock market was not optimistic about the 
companies’ real estate asset strategies albeit reacting favourably on the announcement date itself.  
This could be an indication of irrational market behaviour.  Shareholders overreacted to the 
companies’ announcements on the belief that the announcements were “good” news, when in 
reality, the supposedly piece of “good” news was an empty, speculative bubble.  Thus share 
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investors were forced to sell their shares almost immediately after purchasing them.  Instead of 
holding on to the depreciating shares and incurring a higher loss in the long run, it was better to 
sell on day t = +1 to minimize their losses. 
 
Furthermore, the statistics suggest that there was little opportunity for investors to profit from the 
knowledge of the announcement effect in Singapore.  It is observed from Exhibit 4 that the mean 
prediction error for firms in sub-sample COMP_DISP were 0.56% on day t = +1 and 0.2% on day 
t = +2.  If an investor bought a particular company’s share in the mentioned sub-sample on day t = 
0 and sold the shares at day t = +2, his/her gain would have been about 0.76%.  This would have 
been just enough to cover the then existing commission rate of 0.75% for investors who traded 
stocks on the Internet (The Straits Times dated January 15, 2000).  This implies that speculators 
could not thrive on announcement effects on the market as profits were negated by dealing cost. 
 
Test for Announcement Effect – Completed Acquisitions and Disposals versus the Intent to 
Acquire and Dispose  
 
The abnormal return attendant to a firm’s announcement of its intent to acquire or dispose of its 
assets was relatively higher than the resultant abnormal profit from completion announcement.  
Firms, which announced their intent to acquire or dispose of their assets, experienced an average 
abnormal return of 0.54% and 0.04% respectively on the announcement date (t = 0) (see Exhibit 
4).  However, both abnormal returns are not statistically significant at the 5% level.  These 
findings contrast with earlier research by Asquith et al. (1983). However, companies, which 
announced their intent to dispose of their assets, enjoyed a 6.86% cumulative excess return 
[throughout the event window (-14, +14)], which is statistically significant at the 5% level (see 
Exhibit 5). The average residual or daily prediction error (MPEjt) generally fluctuated from 
positive to negative and vice versa during the two weeks preceding the announcement date (see 
Exhibit 4).  This may be attributed to “noises” or speculation among potential investors.  
 
The values of companies that announced completed disposals or pending disposal activities fell, 
while the values of companies that announced completed acquisitions or pending acquisition 
activities increased, on day t = -1.  The average abnormal negative return was greater for 
companies that announced their intent to dispose of their assets (-0.38%) than for companies that 
announced completion of disposal activities (-0.2%).  Conversely, the average abnormal positive 
return was greater for companies that announced their intent to acquire new assets (0.52%) than 
for companies that announced completion of acquisition activities (0.29%).  These returns are, 
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however, not statistically significant (see Exhibit 4).  Thus it may be concluded that the intent to 
embark upon property acquisition and/or disposal announcement had greater announcement effect 
than the corresponding completion announcement.  This implies that the former type of 
announcement is a more profitable strategy for property companies.  A similar trend is also 
observed on event day t = 0 for companies announcing acquisition activities.  On day t = 0, 
companies in sub-sample COMP_ACQ enjoyed positive abnormal returns of 0.27% while 
companies in sub-sample INT_ACQ enjoyed a higher return of 0.54% (Exhibit 4). Once again, the 
abnormal returns are not statistically significant. Therefore the research hypothesis that the 
announcement of property acquisitions and disposals has a significant impact on share returns is 
rejected. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study contradict past studies [e.g. Ong (1994), Liow (1998) and 
Wong et al (1990)] which conclude that SGX is a weak-form efficient market. The figures in 
Exhibit 5 indicate that investors could profit from companies’ announcements of both their intent 
to acquire/dispose of new/ existing, assets and the expected completion date.  This is evidenced by 
the fact that the values of these companies increased by 1.22% and 4.97% respectively in the (+1, 
+14) interval (see Exhibit 5).  It was advisable to sell these shares immediately the completion of 
the event was finally announced as abnormal returns fell to -1.44% and –0.99% for sub-samples 
COMP_ACQ and COMP_DISP) respectively in the cumulative period (+1, +14) – see Exhibit 5.  
 
Test for Announcement Effect – Property Assets versus Property Divisions/Subsidiary.  
The mean prediction errors (MPEt) and cumulative prediction errors (CPEj) in Exhibits 6 and 7 are 
derived from Equations (2) and (3) while the test statistics are derived from Equations (8) and (10) 
respectively. It would appear from Exhibit 6 that acquisition of property business 
division/subsidiary by a property company is more profitable than acquisition of property assets.  
This is attested by the average abnormal return on event day t = 0 for sub-sample ACQ_B (0.38%) 
which is higher than the return for sub-sample ACQ_P (0.22%).  In addition, the CERj for interval 
(-1, 0) is positive for both sub-samples albeit relatively higher for sub-sample ACQ_B (0.83%) 
than for sub-sample ACQ_P (0.44%)(see Exhibit 7). Investors may feel that Singapore’s property 
market is relatively small, volatile and risky.  Thus, investors more favourably respond to property 
companies’ decisions to venture into different forms of property business divisions or subsidiaries 
such as acquiring a hotel chain, buying into foreign real estate companies and joining in overseas 
real estate development projects, than to acquisition of a single hotel or investment in Singapore.   
Exhibits 6 & 7 here 
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As far as disposal strategies are concerned, the statistics show that SGX values “disposal of 
property business division/subsidiaries” more favourably than “disposal of a property asset”. 
Although the abnormal return (PEjt) on event day t = 0 for firms in DISP_P (0.78%) is greater than 
for firms in DISP_B (0.12%) [Exhibit 6], the abnormal return statistics for interval (-14, -2) and 
(+1, +14) suggest that a strategy to liquidate a property division is more profitable than a strategy 
to divest a property asset (Exhibit 7).    
 
These findings differ from Glascock et al. (1991) and Liow (1997) who conclude that buyers and 
sellers are likely to have a more positive reaction to an announcement relating to property 
transaction than to a property business division or subsidiary.  This disparity may be attributable to 
the fact that this study focuses on property companies while Glascock et al (1991) and Liow 
(1997) deal with non-property companies.  The decision of property companies to dispose of their 
property assets is often construed as signaling that the companies are not performing well in their 
core business – the real estate business. This invariably leads to a fall in the market value of the 
property companies.  
 
It would appear paradoxical that property companies enjoyed positive abnormal returns for 
announcements both to acquire and dispose of a property division/subsidiary. It could be that 
investors view property companies’ “acquisition of property business divisions/subsidiaries” as a 
form of repositioning strategy.  Hence this piece of good news justifies the comparatively higher 
abnormal returns enjoyed by companies in sub-sample ACQ_B.  Similarly, when these companies 
subsequently disposed of their property divisions, the stock market reacted positively to the 
disposal on the pretext that the companies were restructuring their operations to concentrate on 
their core business – Property! 
 
If this study is reflective of future market behaviour, it is important for potential investors to note 
the consecutive negative abnormal returns for companies in sub-sample ACQ_P [See Exhibit 6, 
interval (+1, +9)].  Thus, when property companies announce the completion of their property 
division/subsidiary acquisition, investors should immediately sell their shares.  Since firms in sub-
sample ACQ_B experience positive abnormal returns in interval (-5, +4) and a dip on day t = +1 
(see Exhibit 6), investors may buy and hold shares within this interval to make profit as CPEj for 
(-5, +14) is 1.81%. Furthermore, it is advisable for investors who hold shares of companies in 
DISP_P and DISP_B to sell the shares one or two day(s) after the announcement date as abnormal 
returns become negative thereafter. 
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Size Effect 
“Big” real estate firms which announced completion of an acquisition(s) enjoyed an insignificant 
cumulative excess return of +0.53% whereas “small” real estate firms enjoyed a significant 
negative 0.42% cumulative excess return in the interval (-1, 0) – see Exhibit 8.. On the event day 
itself (t = 0), shareholders in sub-sample (ACQ_BIG) enjoyed positive excess returns of 0.10%, as 
compared to negative excess returns of 0.10% for those in the sub-sample ACQ_SML. However, 
on day t = +1, both big and small real estate firms suffered fallen market values. Comparatively, 
the fall in market value is greater for small real estate firms (-0.57%) than for big real estate firms 
(-0.04%). Notwithstanding fallen market value on day t = +1, big firms enjoyed a 0.01% increase 
in market value in the interval (+1, +14). Small firms, on the other hand, suffered a -1.91% decline 
in market value during the same interval (see Exhibit 9). It must be noted, however, that the size 
effect is noticeable in the (-14, +14) interval where the CPEJ for ACQ_SML and ACQ_BIG are 
+4.08% and -0.45% although both are statistically insignificant. These results imply that 
shareholders of “small” firms could make profit by selling their shares in the (-14, -2) interval 
especially on days t = -14, -11, -10, -4 (Exhibits 9 and 8 respectively). Anyone who purchased 
such shares could not profitably dispose of them in the intervals (-1, 0) and (+1, +14) because of 
continuously depreciating market values. Conversely, investors could buy shares of sub-sample 
ACQ_BIG in the (-14, -2) interval and sold them for a statistically insignificant profit in the (-1, 0) 
and (+1, +14) intervals. 
Exhibits 8 & 9 here 
Turning to the divestiture of assets/business, one could see from Exhibit 9 that “big” firms 
performed better (CPEJ of 3.4%) than “small” firms (CPEJ of -8.14%) in the (-14, +14) interval. 
The mean prediction errors on day t = 0 show that disposal activities are profitable for both 
“small” and “big” firms (Exhibit 8). When “big” real estate firms announced the completion of the 
disposal of their property assets, their abnormal returns were slightly more pronounced (0.30%), 
as compared to those of the “small” real estate firms (0.26%). However, both abnormal returns are 
not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, big companies enjoyed a statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns of 1.04% on day t = +1 while their cumulative abnormal 
returns remained positive during the interval (+1, +14) [see Exhibit 9].  
 
Similarly, small companies enjoyed positive abnormal returns of 0.31% on day t = +1. However, 
they suffered cumulative returns of – 4.84% and –8.14% during the time interval (+1, +14) and 
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whole event window (-14, +14) respectively. This could be attributed to the stock market’s 
irrational behaviour as the market players reacted favourably on the announcement date itself in 
spite of being pessimistic about “small” real estate companies’ disposal strategies.  
 
It would appear from the above analyses that company size does affect the market’s reaction to the 
real estate companies’ disposal decisions. Whenever a company in the sub-sample DISP_SML 
decides to dispose of their property assets, the stock market viewed it as high risk – i.e. the 
company could be having some cash flow problems and needed to liquidate its property assets. On 
the other hand, the stock market viewed the big companies’ similar moves as liquidating assets for 
other forms of investment or diversification into other forms of business. It must be noted, 
however, that while acquisition strategies favoured “small” firms, disposal strategies favoured 
“big” firms. However, the abnormal cumulative returns in either case were statistically 
insignificant. This implies that size effect may not apply to Singapore property stock market, It 
may be cautioned, however, that the small sample size for ACQ_SML, DISP_SML and 
DISP_BIG could invalidate the results of the size effect. Further research is therefore required to 
verify the size effect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The above discourse shows that property acquisition and disposal announcement(s) affect returns 
of property stocks on the SGX. Although acquisition announcements are found to be more 
profitable than disposal announcements, the abnormal return associated with either strategy is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This may imply that news about property companies’ 
acquisition and/or disposal activities is often leaked to the market to dilute the announcement 
effect on the event day (Bowman, 1983). Thus, investors cannot significantly profit from a prior 
knowledge of the announcement date. Furthermore, the size effect does not apply to the Singapore 
property stock market. This finding is consistent with Cotter (1997). 
 
It may be warned that the accuracy of the findings of this study may be affected by calendar 
anomalies such as holiday effect, the January effect and the day of the week effect (Wong et al., 
1999). Furthermore, other material events might have occurred around the event date to bias the 
impact of the event (Owers and Rogers, 1986). For example, the anti-speculation curbs of 15th 
May 1996, and the “Off Budget Measures” of 29th June 1998 might have affected the result(s) of 
acquisition(s) and/or disposal(s) that occurred on, and/or immediately after, these dates. 
 18 
Notwithstanding these caveats, it is hoped that the paper sheds some light on the acquisition 
and/or disposal announcement effect(s) on property stocks on the SGX. 
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Exhibit 1: Frequency of Property Events by Companies** 
 
COMPANY ACQ DISP P B FIRM SIZE 
Bonvests 3 0 1 2 SML 
Bukit Sembawang 1 0 1 0 SML 
Centrepoint Properties# 5 0 5 0 SML 
Chemical Industries 1 0 1 0 SML 
City Developments 23 0 18 5 BIG 
DBS Land+ 32 4 22 14 BIG 
Dragon Land  3 0 3 0 SML 
First Capital  19 9 15 13 BIG 
Hong Fok  3   5 4 4 SML 
Jack Chia MPH# 2 3 0 5 SML 
Keppel Land## 19 4 20 3 BIG 
LC Development 3 3 2 4 SML 
Somerset Holdings++ 10 2 10 2 NA 
MCL Land Ltd 10 1 11 0 BIG 
Marco Polo 4 0 3 1 BIG 
Orchard Parade  4 1 3 2 SML 
Parkway Holdings* 8 4 3 9 BIG 
Scotts Holdings 3 2 3 2 SML 
Singapore Land 3 0 2 1 BIG 
TLB Land# 1 0 1 0 SML 
United Overseas Land 2 1 3 0 BIG 
Wing Tai 4 1 5 0 BIG 
Total 163 40 136 67  
Source: Authors’ compilation  
 
Note 
#: No longer listed on SGX 
## : Previously known as Straits Steamship Land. 
+: DBS Land and Pidemco Land merged to form CapitaLand on 21/11/00. 
++ : Previously known as Liang Court Holdings.Merged with The Ascott Ltd to form Ascott on 25/11/00 
* : Listed as property stock until November,1998. 
** : Figures include both completed and uncompleted acquisition and disposal announcements. 
ACQ: Acquisition announcement. 
DISP: Disposal announcement. 
P: Propert.y 
B: Business division/subsidiary. 
SML: Small. 
NA:  Market value is not available on DataStream. Furthermore, there are no data in SES Journal to compute 
market capitalization to determine firm size. 
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Exhibit 2: Property Events by Type and Year 
 
YEAR COMP_ACQ COMP_DISP INT_ACQ INT_DISP TOTAL 
1994 18 2 1 1 22 
1995 29 7 3 0 39 
1996 31 7 4 6 48 
1997 27 6 4 3 40 
1998 3 3 4 4 14 
1999 32 1 7 0 40 
Total 140 26 23 14 203 
Source: Authors’ compilation  
 
Note: COMP_ACQ: Completed property acquisitions i.e. acquisitions were already completed on the event dates 
COMP_DISP: Completed property disposals i.e. disposals were already completed on the event dates 
INT_ACQ: Uncompleted property acquisitions i.e. only the intention of an acquisition was announced on the 
event dates 
INT_DISP: Uncompleted property disposal i.e. only the intention of a disposal was announced on the event 
dates 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Property Events by Type and Year* 
 
YEAR ACQ_P DISP_P ACQ_B DISP_B TOTAL 
1994 12 2 6 0 20 
1995 15 4 14 3 36 
1996 20 3 11 4 38 
1997 22 2 5 4 33 
1998 2 2 1 1 6 
1999 26 1 6 0 33 
Total 97 14 43 12 166 
Source : Authors’ compilation  
 
Note: ACQ_P: Property acquisitions. 
DISP_P: Property disposals. 
ACQ_B: Business (property) division/subsidiary acquisitions. 
DISP_B: Business (property) division/subsidiary disposals. 
*: Figures relate to announcements that were successfully completed. 
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Exhibit 4: Excess Returns for Acquisitions (ACQ) and Disposals (DISP) by Completion  
(COMP_) and Intention (INT_). 
 
Day 
COMP_ACQ 
J = 140 
MPEt 
COMP_DISP 
J = 26 
MPEt 
INT_ACQ 
J = 23 
MPEt 
INT_DISP 
J = 14 
MPEt 
-14 -0.0019 (-1.0397) -0.0065  (-0.9107) 0.0012  ( 0.3704) 0.0091   ( 1.7982) 
-13 -0.0007 (-0.5719) -0.0073  (-1.0307) -0.0033  (-0.4756) 0.0138   ( 2.3723*) 
-12 -0.0007 (-0.8867) 0.0027  ( 1.2548) -0.0028  (-1.1536) 0.0012   (-0.1165) 
-11 0.0049 ( 2.8836*) 0.0014  ( 0.2964) -0.0074  (-1.1504) 0.0039   ( 0.1258) 
-10 0.0050 ( 3.0165*) -0.0016  ( 0.1857) 0.0040  ( 0.7866) 0.0139   ( 2.3744*) 
-9 -0.0042 (-2.5955*) -0.0001  (-0.1723) -0.0014  (-0.9212) -0.0086  (-1.8231) 
-8 0.0009 ( 0.1370) -0.0025  (-0.5262) -0.0044  (-0.8081) 0.0118  ( 1.5611) 
-7 -0.0017 (-1.4596) 0.0014  (-0.2851) 0.0086  ( 1.9072) -0.0139   (-1.3829) 
-6 -0.0011 (-0.2291) 0.0019  ( 0.2209) -0.0005  (-0.4518) 0.0103  ( 2.8222 *) 
-5 0.0002  ( 1.2519) 0.0023  ( 0.3201) 0.0050  ( 1.2827) -0.0159  (-1.3254) 
-4 -0.0008  ( 0.6246) -0.0052  (-1.1055) -0.0069  (-1.3150) -0.0207  (-2.7516*) 
-3 0.0008  ( 0.9101) 0.0068  ( 1.6835) -0.0154 (-3.4605*) 0.0049   ( 0.6977) 
-2 0.0011  ( 1.4004) 0.0073  ( 1.7098) 0.0012  ( 0.8872) 0.0127   ( 2.5805*) 
-1 0.0029  ( 1.3487) -0.0020  (-0.7226) 0.0052  ( 0.9098) -0.0038   (-0.8293) 
0 0.0027  ( 0.6259) 0.0047  ( 1.1733) 0.0054  ( 1.0312) 0.0004  ( 0.2853) 
+1 -0.0041  (-0.6985) 0.0056  ( 1.5636) 0.0093  ( 1.8637) -0.0085   (-0.5245) 
+2 -0.0019  (-0.1621) 0.0020  ( 0.3262) -0.0072  (-1.9200) 0.0173   ( 1.6306) 
+3 -0.0005  ( 0.5297) -0.0008  ( 0.1311) 0.0036  ( 0.3498) -0.0012   (-0.4484) 
+4 -0.0013  (-1.2641) -0.0067  (-0.7047) -0.0009  ( 0.2882) 0.0110   ( 1.5212) 
+5 -0.0009  ( 0.6808) 0.0038  ( 0.6902 ) 0.0026  ( 0.6573) 0.0033   ( 1.3120) 
+6 -0.0005  (1.8478) 0.0021  ( 0.4260) 0.0090  ( 1.5931) 0.0059   ( 0.7980) 
+7 -0.0037  (-2.2250*) -0.0015  (-0.0699) -0.0018  ( 0.0512) -0.0032  (-0.6408) 
+8 -0.0022  (-0.8050) -0.0095  (-1.7556) 0.0060  ( 0.9125) 0.0125   ( 1.8419) 
+9 -0.0032  (-1.3380) 0.0036  ( 0.3264) 0.0045  ( 1.1572) 0.0116   ( 2.1164*) 
+10 -0.0007  ( 0.2397) -0.0024 (-0.4791) -0.0049  (-0.8726) -0.0001   (-0.3225) 
+11 0.0015  ( 1.4069) -0.0052 (-1.0461) -0.0127  (-2.0800*) -0.0030   (-1.1857) 
+12 0.0039  ( 2.0647*) -0.0049 (-1.0814) 0.0026  ( 0.4768) 0.0108  ( 1.7824) 
+13 -0.0006  (-0.8626) 0.0086  ( 1.8792) 0.0064  ( 1.1959) 0.0079   ( 0.8163) 
+14 -0.0001  ( 0.8117) -0.0048  (0.2922) -0.0044  (-0.5241) -0.0145   (-2.3450*) 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Test statistics are in parenthesis.  J is the size of each sub-sample. 
*  :  Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed. 
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Exhibit 5: Cumulative returns for acquisitions (ACQ) and disposals (DISP) by completion 
(COMP_) and intention (INT_)]. 
 
Interval 
COMP_ACQ 
J = 140 
CPEj 
COMP_DISP 
J = 26 
CPEj 
INT_ACQ 
J = 23 
CPEj 
INT_DISP 
J = 14 
CPEj 
-14     +14 -0.0070  ( 1.1328) -0.0066  ( 0.3723) 0.0007  ( 0.1092) 0.0686  ( 2.3659*) 
-14     -2 0.0018  ( 1.0816) 0.0005  ( 0.4550) -0.0221 (-1.2487) 0.0223  ( 1.9228) 
-1       0 0.0056  ( 1.3963) 0.0027  ( 0.3187) 0.0106  ( 1.3726) -0.0034  (-0.3847) 
+1    +14 -0.0144  ( 0.0604) -0.0099  (-0.0230) 0.0122  ( 0.8416) 0.0497  ( 1.6977) 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Test statistics are in parenthesis.  J is the size of each sub-sample. 
*  :  Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed.
 26 
Exhibit 6: Excess Returns by Realty Assets (P) and Property Business Division (B)#. 
 
 
Day 
ACQ_P 
J = 97 
MPEt 
ACQ_B 
J = 43 
MPEt 
DISP_P 
J = 14 
MPEt 
DISP_B 
J = 12 
MPEt 
-14 -0.0005 (-1.6210) -0.0051 (-3.7113*) 0.0003 (-3.4507*) -0.0144 (-5.6962*) 
-13 -0.0013 (-2.2098*) 0.0007 (-1.6779) -0.0079 (-4.6976*) -0.0066 (-3.9487*) 
-12 -0.0015 (-2.6323*) 0.0010 (-1.3064) 0.0050 (-2.0190*) -0.0001 (-2.9004*) 
-11 0.0053 ( 1.0954) 0.0042 ( 0.2029) 0.0005 (-3.0011*) 0.0023 (-2.6729*) 
-10 0.0063 ( 2.0269*) 0.0020 (-0.6513) -0.0028 (-2.5046*) -0.0002 (-2.7949*) 
-9 -0.0052 (-3.7478*) -0.0020 (-1.7994) -0.0009 (-2.7288*) 0.0008 (-2.5024*) 
-8 0.0015 (-0.6599) -0.0006 (-1.2016) -0.0006 (-2.0602*) -0.0048 (-3.1680*) 
-7 -0.0010 (-1.3179) -0.0032 (-2.7893*) -0.0017 (-2.8596*) 0.0050 (-1.3724) 
-6 -0.0010 ( 0.4049) -0.0014(-2.0248*) -0.0021(-2.1617*) 0.0065 (-0.8041) 
-5 -0.0001 ( 0.4297) 0.0007 ( 0.0885) 0.0065 (-0.8548) -0.0027 (-1.4923) 
-4 -0.0016 ( 0.1925) 0.0011 (-0.3821) -0.0039 (-1.8172) -0.0067 (-1.9738*) 
-3 0.0011 ( 0.2343) 0.0002 ( 0.3752) 0.0041 ( 0.5430) 0.0099 ( 0.1595) 
-2 -0.0006 ( 0.5500) 0.0048 ( 1.0908) 0.0023 ( 0.8004) 0.0133 ( 0.4975) 
-1 0.0022 ( 0.3014) 0.0045 ( 1.6759) -0.0046 (-1.6970) 0.0011 ( 0.1920) 
0 0.0022 ( 0.2818) 0.0038 (0.7061) 0.0078 ( 1.5806) 0.0012 ( 0.0198) 
+1 -0.0050 (-0.1661) -0.0020 (-0.7058) 0.0049 ( 1.4697) 0.0065 (1.2914) 
+2 -0.0040 (-0.3547) 0.0027 ( 0.8503) 0.0057 ( 1.1702) -0.0024 ( 0.3709) 
+3 -0.0015 ( 0.2834) 0.0019 ( 1.4451) -0.0010 ( 0.9154) -0.0005 ( 0.9363) 
+4 -0.0020 (-0.6575) 0.0004 (-0.0735) -0.0104 ( 0.3840) -0.0023 ( 0.8574) 
+5 -0.0008 (1.5251) -0.0013 (0.4628) 0.0062 (2.1236*) 0.0010 ( 1.6090) 
+6 -0.0007 (2.3439*) 0.0001 (1.6437) 0.0010 (1.5075) 0.0034 ( 2.4629*) 
+7 -0.0034 (-0.9232) -0.0043 (-0.4931) -0.0033 (1.6421) 0.0007 ( 2.1648*) 
+8 -0.0019 (0.1222) -0.0030 (0.8039) -0.0116 (0.3384) -0.0069 ( 1.6691) 
+9 -0.0028 (-0.2773) -0.0042 (0.7472) 0.0019 (2.0469*) 0.0057 ( 3.4657*) 
+10 0.0000 (1.8312) -0.0022 (0.7321) -0.0010 (2.8481*) -0.00409 ( 1.9920*) 
+11 0.0006 (1.8919) 0.0034 (3.0520*) -0.0030 (2.8552*) -0.0078 ( 1.7271) 
+12 0.0046 (3.0864*) 0.0023 (2.7500*) -0.0026 (2.7131*) -0.0076 ( 2.4060*) 
+13 -0.0017 (-0.2373) 0.0019 (2.7649*) 0.0117 (5.3303*) 0.0050 ( 4.5143*) 
+14     -0.0013 (1.7984) 0.0025 (3.0334*) -0.0106 (2.4434*) 0.0020 ( 5.0135*) 
Source: Authors, calculation 
Note:    Test statistics are in parenthesis.  
# : Exhibit deals with completed events only. 
J : The size of each sub-sample. 
* : Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed. 
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Exhibit 7: Cumulative Excess Return By Property Assets (P) and Property Business Division 
(B). – Completions Only 
 
 
Interval 
ACQ_P 
J = 97 
CPEj 
ACQ_B 
J = 43 
CPEj 
DISP_P 
J = 14 
CPEj 
DISP_B 
J = 12 
CPEj 
-14        +14 0.0088  (0.6675) -0.0100  (1.0414) -0.0027  (0.1596) -0.0027  (0.3756) 
-14         -2 0.0015  (0.9165) 0.0024  (0.5750) -0.0011  (0.2727) 0.0024  (0.3752) 
 -1            0 0.0044  (0.4842) 0.0083  (1.7922) 0.0031  (0.1067) 0.0023  (0.3538) 
+1         +14 -0.0200 (-0.1055) -0.0018  (0.2674) -0.0121  (-0.0734) -0.0074 (0.0453) 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note:  
 Test statistics are in parenthesis.  
 J is the size of each sub-sample. 
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Exhibit 8: Excess Returns for Acquisitions (ACQ_) and Disposals (DISP_) for Small (SML) 
and Big (BIG) Companies.   
Day 
ACQ_SML 
J = 16 
MPEt 
ACQ_BIG 
J = 76 
MPEt 
DISP_SML 
J = 7 
MPEt 
DISP_BIG 
J = 12 
MPEt 
-14 0.0043 (2.1583 *) -0.0030 (-1.5021) -0.0209 (-1.7554 *) -0.0015 (-0.0242) 
-13 -0.0070 (-0.3529) -0.0003 (-0.0487) -0.0088 (-0.6293 ) -0.0106 (-0.7657) 
-12 0.0055 (0.6614 ) 0.0014 (0.1691) -0.0114 (-0.7326) 0.0176 (3.1160 *) 
-11 0.0217 (4.7051 *) -0.0007 (0.3705) -0.0059 (-0.2129) 0.0065 (0.5144) 
-10 0.0159 (2.5504 *) 0.0014 (0.7645) -0.0072 (-0.4241) -0.0027 (-0.5891) 
-9 -0.0027 (-0.6433) -0.0031 (-1.1894) 0.0017 (0.0920) -0.0010 (-0.1429) 
-8 -0.0003 (-0.0612) -0.0017  (-0.4631 ) 0.0016 (0.4794) -0.0016 (-0.1464) 
-7 0.0033 (-0.6859) -0.0004 (-0.0605 ) 0.0027 (0.1810) 0.0007 (-0.6121) 
-6 0.0014 (0.4941) -0.0001 (0.7256 ) 0.0089 (0.8300) -0.0039 (-0.6214) 
-5 -0.0035 (-1.9353) -0.0015 (0.3694 ) -0.0160 (-0.8012) 0.0066 (0.2074) 
-4 0.0196 (3.3327 *) -0.0022 (0.0294 ) -0.0141 (-1.3693) -0.0056 (-1.0614) 
-3 0.0045 (1.2767 ) -0.0013 (0.1696 ) 0.0154 (0.9760) 0.0075 (2.0180 *) 
-2 0.0011 (1.2402 ) 0.0013 (1.3869 ) 0.0069 (0.2455) 0.0144 (2.6839 *) 
-1 -0.0032 (-0.3666) 0.0043 (1.6893 ) 0.0115 (1.0569) -0.0097 (-1.5426) 
0 -0.0010 (-1.0727 ) 0.0010 (0.3637 ) 0.0026 (0.2104) 0.0030 (0.7144) 
+1 -0.0057 (-2.2886* ) -0.0004 (0.9850 ) 0.0031 (0.1756) 0.0104 (1.9909 *) 
+2 -0.0039 (-1.0668) -0.0012 (-0.0291 ) -0.0019 (-0.1522) 0.0029 (0.2683) 
+3 0.0008 (0.6600 ) 0.0013 (1.1735 ) -0.0027 (-0.0835) -0.0002 (0.1426) 
+4 -0.0141 (-3.5103 *) -0.0021 (-1.0076 ) -0.0037 (-0.2911) -0.0089 (-0.4146) 
+5 -0.0002 (0.1329) 0.0020 (2.0740 ) -0.0031 (-0.1629) 0.0108 (1.5208) 
+6 -0.0014 (0.9786 ) 0.0034 (2.6375 *) 0.0114 (2.0023 *) 0.0002 (-0.4619) 
+7 -0.0049 (-1.5297 ) -0.0023 (-0.4251 ) 0.0008 (0.1210) 0.0013 (0.4300) 
+8 0.0011 (0.1756 ) -0.0024 (-0.7654 ) -0.0232 (-2.1722 *) -0.0048 (-0.6521) 
+9 -0.0009 (0.8241 ) -0.0041 (-1.0347 ) -0.0007 (-0.1122) 0.0018 (-0.5919) 
+10 0.0052 (0.7858 ) 0.0007 (0.6005 ) -0.0062 (-0.4430) 0.0005 (0.1601) 
+11 -0.0007 (0.2132) 0.0017 (0.7848 ) 0.0003 (0.4246) -0.0086 (-1.3309) 
+12 0.0058 (1.2751) 0.0025 (1.3490 ) -0.0173 (-2.1774 *) 0.0020 (0.4149) 
+13 -0.0048 (-1.0009) 0.0010 (-0.2215 ) 0.0024 (-0.0980) 0.0122 (1.7405) 
+14 0.0045 (2.1532 *) -0.0003 (0.3891 ) -0.0079 (-0.3506) -0.0053 (-0.0822) 
    Source: Author’s calculation 
   Note: Test statistics are in parenthesis.  
          J is the size of each sub-sample. 
        *  :  Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed. 
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Exhibit 9: Cumulative Returns for Acquisitions (ACQ) and Disposals (DISP_) for Small (SML) 
and Big (BIG) Companies.  
Interval 
ACQ_SML 
J = 16 
CPEj 
ACQ_BIG 
J = 76 
CPEj 
DISP_SML 
J = 7 
CPEj 
DISP_BIG 
J = 12 
CPEj 
-14     +14 0.0408 (1.6904) -0.0045 (1.7240) -0.0814 (-0.9606) 0.0340 (1.2781)  
-14     -2 0.0640 (3.5336 *) -0.0099 (0.2000 ) -0.0471 (-0.8655) 0.0264 (1.2693 ) 
-1       0 -0.0042 (-2.8787 *) 0.0053 (1.4517 ) 0.0141 (0.8961) -0.0067 (-0.5857 ) 
+1    +14 -0.0191 (-0.5874 ) 0.0001 (1.7399 ) -0.0484 (-0.8872) 0.0143 (0.8377) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: Test statistics are in parenthesis.  J is the size of each sub-sample. 
*  :  Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed. 
 
